Bolzano's theory of Inbegriffe (collections) has standardly been taken to be a rudimentary theory of sets, and Bolzano' s imputed role as pathfinder for the later work on sets by Cantor and Dedekind has been based on this anticipation as weIl as on Bolzano's account of infinity in Paradoxien des Unendlichen (PdU). In arecent book however Frank Krickel (1995) has questioned the standard interpretation and has proposed instead that Bolzano's theory be seen as a mereology or theory of part and whole. On examining Bolzano's texts I have come to the conclusion that both interpretations are mistaken and that Bolzano' s theory of collections is best interpreted neither as a theory of sets nor (iS a mereology but as a distinct and distinctive theory of collections. This paper gives evidence for this conclusion.
Collective Entities in General
In order to identifY Bolzano's collections it is important to have a map or classification ofthe various kinds of collective entity which have been described and mooted in the philosophieal, logical and mathematical literature. The first section provides an outline zoology of coIIectives.
We start with sets. Set theory is an established branch of mathematics, much mused upon by philosophers of mathematics and logic, and its history is generally traced back to the work of Cantor. While a general notion of class has been with us since Plato, and was brought to mathematical clarity by the work of Boole, Jevons, Schröder and Huntington, the mathematical theory of sets goes far beyond that. The difference may be made clear by considering the very simple Boolean algebra of classes and the much more powerful axiomatic theories due to Zermelo and others. The major difference between the Boolean algebra of classes and the theory of sets lies in the much stronger set formation principles or conditional existence postulates employed in the latter, notably the power set axiom, the axiom ofinfinity and the replacement axiom. Togetherthey account for the great power and general utility of set theory within mathematics, and their predecessor principles also accounted for the antinomie nature of early, so-called naive set theory. The Boolean algebra of classes on the other hand never gets beyond a fixed pregiven uni verse of individuals and is simply the theory of subclasses ofthis universe.
The nature of sets as entities is not wholly clear, but a number of characteristics of sets as standardly understood should be mentioned. They are EXTENSIONALITY: sets are identical ifand only ifthey have the same elements NULL: there is a set with 00 elements SINGLETON: for every object there is a set with that object as sole element, the singleton set of the object, which is distinct from that object ELEMENTHOOD: every set is an element of another set INDIVIDUALITY: sets are individuals (by an individual I und erstand not an Urelement, but the referent of a genuinely singular term) ABSTRACTNESS: sets are abstract entities.
What the last amounts to is as clear or unclear as the notion of an abstract entity, but it includes at least the following (not independent) characteristics:
-they are not in time or space -they are not implicated in causal relationships -they do not come into existence, change, or cease to be -they have no positive physical properties.
It is sometimes said that abstract entities exist necessarily, by con-
